How to keep the Rail safety debate on track?

Railway accidents frequently hit the news—the latest being the derailment of 12 coaches of the Mysore-Darbhanga Express at Kavaraipettai, Tamil Nadu. Two contrasting narratives predicated on political leanings inevitably arise: one, accidents have increased due to Indian Railways (IR) focusing on glamorous projects like Vande Bharat and glitzy stations instead of prioritising passenger safety; and second, a rise in accidents and near-misses is due to sabotage. Both perspectives, however, fail to grasp the full picture.

While the opposition accuses IR of ignoring safety, IR presents data showing a reduction in accidents and fatalities since 2014. This decrease is not solely the result of the current government’s efforts but part of long-term work by successive regimes. Major steps include eliminating unmanned level crossings, upgrading track maintenance, modernising signalling systems, and replacing less safe coaches with the more efficient Linke-Hofmann-Busch models.

But comparing today’s accident rates with the past is a misplaced approach. Technology is now available to achieve near-zero accidents, and that should be the goal. Given the hike in the capital budget—with nearly 25 percent of the Centre’s capex going to IR—funding is not an issue. The challenge lies in focus and execution.

Recent incidents such as the Balasore tragedy and accidents involving the Chandigarh-Dibrugarh and Sabarmati Express have led some to believe external enemies are at work. The ministry released a list of 24 cases since June 2023 where obstructions like wooden logs, concrete milestones and even motorcycles were found on tracks.

However, most of these cases do not seem severe enough to cause a derailment, and some involve juvenile mischief rather than sabotage. While a few incidents may merit concern, lumping these with minor obstructions only serves to stoke panic. Investigating agencies are looking into potential sabotage, but we should wait for their findings before jumping to conclusions.

There is still a clear need for the IR to ramp up patrolling and direct operating staff to be more cautious, but comprehensive solutions lie in intelligence and counter-disruption measures. Nevertheless, it is disappointing that months of investigations have yet to yield any evidence linking these incidents to terrorist entities; if their objective has been to cause panic instead of derailment, they seem to be succeeding.

Some of these incidents were cases of mischief. In one case, a group of railway staff planted fishplates on tracks in a bizarre attempt to win a safety award. In another, a disgruntled worker placed detonators on a track in the face of a military train. These incidents are being sensationalised, often ignoring the eventual revelations.

The real issue, however, lies in how IR is handling safety improvements and communication. The CRS’s report on the recent Kanchenjunga accident found fault not only with the train crew and station staff but also with management’s failure to enforce safety protocols during signal failures. In response, IR belatedly issued new guidelines, a move that should have happened long ago.

The then-CEO of IR prematurely announced the crash was caused by the crew’s error and both crew members had died. In reality, the assistant survived, and the cause was more complicated, showing a lack of clarity in communication, reflecting poorly on IR’s crisis management.

Another significant safety challenge is the slow rollout of Kavach, an indigenous anti-collision system. Despite trials on the South Central Railway nearly three years ago, the system has yet to expand. IR cites limited industrial capacity as a reason for the delays—a poor excuse as if capacity is insufficient, it is IR’s responsibility to foster investment and capacity-building.

Meanwhile, if IR is not confident of Kavach’s reliability, it should adopt the proven European Train Control System (ETCS) Level II on key routes until Kavach fully matures. It is ironic that while IR drags its feet, the Ministry of Housing has implemented an advanced version of ETCS Level II for its Regional Rapid Transit trains.

A clear roadmap for Kavach coverage with annual targets is lacking. While trials for the next version, Kavach 4.0, is publicised, the current system is not fully operational anywhere, including SC Railway, let alone on Delhi-Howrah and Delhi-Mumbai routes that were sanctioned long back. IR’s vague goal of nationwide rollout by 2030 is neither reassuring nor realistic.

Accidents in automatic signal territories remain a recurring problem. Near-misses are frequent, and CRS inquiries have imputed them to managerial indifference. The question is, why has IR not embraced AI-based applications to provide actionable insights to help prevent accidents, given that digital data available from stations and locomotives lies uncollated? While IR announced AI use for non-essential applications like passenger amenities and monitoring toilet smell, in this area, one hears only of the tired inspectorial refrain: monitor data at the DRM’s level daily, and the board will do sample checks in 2-3 divisions.

IR has increased ultrasonic testing for track defects, rehabilitated numerous bridges, and built hundreds of flyovers and underpasses. But these improvements must be paired with a relentless focus on areas like eliminating safety-critical vacancies, particularly of train crew, station operating staff, and signal maintainers.

While IR’s safety record has improved, that is no longer enough. With modern technology and funding, there is no excuse for anything less than a strong move towards near-zero accidents. It is time for IR to stop hiding behind statistics and make railway safety its highest priority.